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Abstract: Time of day prices for electricity are usually preferable to
constant rates, as the true cost of generating energy varies over the
course of a day. But time of day rates are still inefficient,
because prices do not change in step with day by day random fluctuations
in actual generating costs. Spot prices, which change every five minutes,
can avoid this inefficiency by tracking actual marginal cost.
This paper empirically estimates the ability of industrial
customers to respond to rapidly varying prices. The conclusion is
that some customers will be able to react quickly to such prices.
Because the estimates were made from a rate structure which is not
a full spot pricing system, the magnitude of customer response
remains problematic. Also, it appears that the utility in questions
could make a minor change to its rate structure which would help
both it and its customers.
INDUSTRIAL RESPONSE TO SPOT ELECTRICITY PRICES;
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
I. Introduction
Electricity pricing schedules in which rates change periodically have become
the subject of increasing discussion in the U.S. The proposal usually advanced
is that different rates per kilowatt hour should be charged during different,
prespecified, periods of the day, week, and year. Such rates are generally
referred to as time of day rates, and have in fact been implemented in various
parts of the U.S.1 /
Time of day rates are superior to constant rates, as measured by overall
welfare, because customers are more likely to pay the marginal cost of gener-
ating the electricity they use. When demand is high for a utility or reli-
ability region, the marginal cost is high. Hence time of day rates are set
higher for those periods when demand is usually high.
However, setting prices in advance can never achieve a full welfare
optimum, since actual demand at any time in the future can vary considerably
from its "normal" level. Furthermore, since prices are not adjusted in re-
sponse to actual demands, the possibility arises that demand will be higher
than available capacity, making rationing necessary.2/
A new concept for pricing electricity addresses these problems. New
technology makes it possible to change prices every few minutes, and to
signal the current price to customers. In this way, the price will track
the actual marginal cost of generation, rather than the marginal cost of
generating the amount of power "usually" demanded at that time of day.
Furthermore the need for reserves, including spinning reserves, may be
reduced if customers can respond rapidly enough to higher prices. When
demand approaches the utilities capacity, it can respond by raising prices.
Those customers most able to reduce demand will do so, returning the system
to equilibrium. This concept, called "homeostatic control", was the sub-
ject of a recent conference.3 /
An important issue in the value of such a pricing system is the cus-
tomer's ability to respond to rapidly changing prices. For customers who
are risk averse or who have to "lock in" their schedules in advance,
-2-
it would be possible to sell options or futures.4/ But it is still desir-
able to sell a substantial amount of power on a spot basis, to allow for
unanticipated weather, outages, etc. (By charging a premium for options
or futures over the expected spot price, the utility could make sure some
customers would be willing to buy on the spot market.5 /
How would customers react to spot prices? Presumably the best can-
didates would be large industrial customers, who already have automated
process sequencing and control equipment and whose volume of electricity
use would best justify the cost of special metering and communication
equipment. But there are very few studies on how industrial customers
react even to time of day rates, with their price schedules set a year
or more in advance.6 / There is apparently no data at all on how cus-
tomers will react to spot prices.7/ Until there is some evidence that
customers can and will react within a few minutes to a newly announced
price, the concept of really being able to maintain "homeostasis"'in the
utility system by spot pricing must be considered speculative.
This paper is a first attempt to explore this issue, using empirical
data from a rate which has been in effect for two years in California.
This rate schedule is not a true spot pricing system, but it has the essen-
tial feature: customers do not know how much they will pay for electricity
until the time they actually use it. The reason is that the customers are
assessed a charge based on their power demand at the time the entire system
experienced its monthly peak. (So in fact, the customers don't know how
much they paid for electricity until the end of the month! This complica-
tion can be put aside by assuming the customer calculates the probability
that the current period will be assessed the special charge, and uses this
probability to calculate the expected value of the current price.) There-
fore it should give evidence about the ability of large customers to react
quickly to newly "announced" prices.
Qualitative Discussion of Customer Ability to Respond to Spot Prices
It is rare for economists to concern themselves with fluctuations
which take place from minute to minute. /The next few paragraphs sketch
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the types of response we may expect on this time scale. The most impor-
tant implication is that each customer will be unique.
It is important to distinguish among three different issues concerning
the time a particular price lasts.
1. How long is each actual spot price in effect? For current time of day
pricing schedules, for example, a price may be in effect from 5 p.m.
to 10 p.m. each weekday. True spot prices might be posted for as
little as five minutes.
2. How far in advance is the customer told what the price will be? For
a time of day schedule which must be cleared by a regulatory commission,
this will be months to years. For a spot price, the price may be an-
nounced only a few seconds ahead of time.9 / Or the customer might buy an
option which fixes the price several days in advance. Advance warning is
important because it allows the customer to choose his capital stock,
tell his workers what time to report for work, and set up an optimal
production schedule in a job shop type of operation. (With advance
warnings respectively of years, weeks, and days/hours.)
3. How far in advance are the rules which will subsequently generate the
actual spot prices announced? Knowing these rules allows the customer
to predict the probability distribution of spot prices, and plan ac-
cordingly. For example, he may redesign his plant to allow more short
term adjustments to be made. Or he may sign contracts with his union
to allow him to schedule breaks at a different time each day. IO/
Suppose the customer is told there is a 50% chance that from 1 p.m. to
2 p.m. the next day, the price of his electricity will be $1.00/kwh. Other-
wise it will be the normal 4¢/kwh. He then has three basic ways of re-
ducing his electricity demand during that interval.
1. Rescheduling. He can take operations which he would perform anyway
and which do not use much electricity, and move them to the 1-2 p.m.
interval. Candidates are: lunch breaks, machine changeovers, and
routine maintenance.
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2. Storage. He can "store" electricity in advance, in one of two forms.
a. As heat. He can run his air conditioners hard all morning,
and be prepared to turn them off at 1 p.m. (This is particu-
larly effective strategy for large buildings.)
b. As embodied end product from an electricity intensive process.
He can run the electricity intensive process hard all morning,
and store its output to be fed to the next stage downstream.
This type of adjustment requires advance provision in the form
of surge tanks, and oversized capacity at critical stages of
a product flow line.
3. Outright curtailment. He can simply shut down the power intensive
unit at 1 p.m. If he has no room to store the upstream product, he
may have to shut down the whole production line. In any case, he
will have to shut down all of his downstream operations.
The costs of these three alternatives will depend on the particular
plant configuration, labor costs, opportunity costs of reduced output,
whether the plant is operating at full capacity, etc. It is clear that
the costs and opportunities for curtailments in response to higher prices
will depend on the particular circumstances of each plant. It is also
clear that a plant designed for flexibility will have more opportunities
for adjustment than will an automobile sytle assembly line. Thus the price
elasticity of response to spot prices may improve for a decade or more after
their introduction.
-5-
II. The San Diego Data
The actual rate structure used by San Diego Gas & Electric Company is
very different than the spot market pricing system outlined above. It and
the resulting data for estimation are discussed in this section.
All customers whose peak demand exceeds 4,500 kw during a month are
placed on Schedule A-6. There are five charges on this schedule:
a. A metering charge of $600 per month.
b. A time of day differentiated rate, per kilowatt hour of electricity
used. Presently usage during the peak hours is charged l¢/kwh,
usage during semi-peak costs .5¢/kwh, and usage during off-peak
.25¢/kwh. These rates have changed every few months; they were
about .3¢/kwh lower in early 1978.
c. An energy "adjustment" which is the bulk of the total expense. It
is rougly 3 per kwh, regardless of time of day.
d. A peaking charge which depends on the amount of power used by the
customer during the 15 minute period which turns out to be the time
of the system's peak total load for that billing month. Thus neither
the customer nor the utility know in advance which period will be
the critical period.11 / The charge is presently $7.67 per kilowatt.
For a customer with flat demand over the course of the month, this
charge could be 25% of his total bill.
e. Various minor taxes and special charges.
Only the fourth of these charges is of interest in this paper.
This coincident peak demand charge (abbreviated Cpeak, to distinguish
it from standard demand charges which are based on the customer's own
peak demand during the month) can come to $250,000 per year, out of
a total bill of $1 million. This rate structure has been in effect
since late 1977.
The Sample
There are currently 21 customers on this rate schedule. For these customers,
demand is recorded every 15 minutes by recording meters. In addition, six
of these customers have special telephone hook-ups to San Diego Gas and
Electric (SDG&E) which tells the customers the system's total load at each
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instant. Thus these customers can monitor the system load and assign a
probability to the event "the next 15 minutes will show the highest system
load for my entire billing month". When this probability is high, the
expected value of the Cpeak charge is also high. Most of the time, however,
this probability will be zero. The remaining customers, who lack the tele-
phone hook-ups, can also estimate probabilities, but their estimates will
be much more diffuse.1 2/
Of the six customers with telephone links, three are government owned
and three are privately owned manufacturing plants. Six months of data
were selected from each of the three industrial customers; June, July, and
August 1978 and 1979. This provided about 120 observations on each customer.1 3/
Very important additional information was the actual daily SDG&E peak
system load, in MW, and its time of occurence.14/ This data was used to
generate probabilities that each 15 minute interval would be the critical
one.
Problems with the Data
The only major problem with this data is that the six customers who re-
ceived the real time information by telephone were self-selected. Presum-
ably they felt that the monetary value of this information was worth the
cost of the leased phone line and the associated analog to digital conver-
sion equipment. These six are not likely to be typical of the 21 customers
on schedule A-6. They will have the highest marginal benefit from the im-
proved probability estimates. (But not necessarily the highest total benefit
from adjusting their demands to the Cpeak charge.)
Furthermore, San Diego is not a "typical" industrial city. It is im-
possible to say to what extent San Diego's largest electricity users response
to this rate structure is typical of how others would respond. Therefore
all of the estimates in this paper must be interpreted as conditional on
the observed sample.
Other minor problems were encountered. Some customers' demand data was
mildly multicollinear over the six month sampled. July 3 and other days ad-
jacent to holidays were dropped when appropriate.l5/
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III. An Econometric Model of Demand as a Function of Spot Prices
Customers will respond to the random portion of San Diego Gas
& Electric's price schedule in two stages. First, they will estimate the
probability that the Cpeak charge will be assessed on their demand over
the next few minutes. If it is assessed, then the cost of each kilowatt
hour used over a 15 minute period is 4 x $7.67 or about $30/kwh. If it
is not assessed, then the cost is about 4 per kwh. Customers may
evaluate the probability of this Bernoulli distributed event using any
of a wide range of current and historical information, by any means from
subjective judgement to real time computer analysis.
Second, given their probability estimate, customers must decide how
to react. Since these are large industrial customers, it is reasonable to
assume that they are expected value maximizers. Therefore they will
respond to the product of the probability (of incurring the Cpeak charge)
times the charge. This gives them an estimated "pseudo price" for their
electricity use over the next 15 minutes. The larger this pseudo price,
the less electricity they will use. The amount of demand reduction depends
on how much advance warning they get, and on how costly it is for them to
cut demand quickly but briefly. It is this second response function
(demand as a function of pseudo price) that we wish to estimate, since it
will suggest whether the same customers would respond to true spot prices.
Estimating the Pseudo Price
Before deciding whether to reduce its electricity use, each customer
must estimate the pseudo price in the next few minutes. This is proportional
to the probability that the next 15 minute interval will include the system's
peak load for the month.
Utilities have developed for their own purposes load forecasting
techniques which cover both of the relevant time scales (minutes and weeks).
Time series and weather dependent methods have both been used. See for
example the survey by F.D. Galiana 17/ and the multitude of papers
published in the early 1970's, such as Galiana and Schweppe.1 8/ These
*Casual readers may skip this subsection as the methods used are not crucial.
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forecasting methods provide a "most likely" forecast for utility planning
purposes, and often a (very conservative) confidence band of the
maximum possible load. For calculating pseudo prices, such forecasts
must be adapted to give the probability of an extreme value, rather than
the most likely value.
For this investigation, a comparatively simple but adequate model was
used to calculate pseudo prices. No weather data, weather forecast data,
or knowledge of the minute by minute dynamics of system load was available.l9/
Therefore a purely time series model of daily peaks was developed, ignoring
the minute by minute dynamics. Because of the pattern of SDG&E's peak
loads, this model probably gives a good representation of the true
pseudo prices.20 / A completely accurate calculation would have to use
Monte Carlo techniques, because of the very complex conditional relationships
inherent in minute by minute data with high autocorrelations at the
highest frequencies and at frequencies of days, weeks, and years. Further-
more, historical weather forecasts would be needed, since if tomorrow is
likely to be hotter than today, today is unlikely to be a peak. (The
real object here is to mimic the decision making procedures used by the
customers. It is unlikely that all of them are this sophisticated.)
The basic probability calculating model is as follows.
(1) P[ Sn(t) P[ S(t) S] x P[SnSSn Sn(t)]
where 
S = Highest system load for the billing month.
Sn = Highest system load for day n.
Sn(t) = System load at time t of day n, where t is the midpoint
of a 15 minute interval.
A
Sn(t) = Max . [ Sn(t+k) ] = Highest level of system load during
_-7tI47 the current interval. 2 1 /
In words, the probability that the current 15 minute interval will turn
out to have been the peak for the month is the probability that it is
the peak for today, times the probability that the current reading will
not be exceeded any other day this month.
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One very important indentity dominates the evaluation of equation 1:
A
(2) I[^n =S Sn( A 0 (°if S < S for any k<n in the current
(2) P[ n~ =S n =S Sn(t)] = r R n billing month.
P[Sn+l <S n] P[Sn+2¢Sn Sn+l Sn] x ....
20 n I' n+l 2' "' 19 t
if SSk for all kn in current month.
In words, day n is a candidate to be the peak for the month only if no
previous day has had a higher daily peak. If day n passes this test,
its chance of being a peak is the probability that all of the succeeding
days of the month have lower daily peaks. (The exact form of equation 2
assumes 20 business days in a month.)
Finally, we assume that the daily peaks n are independent, identically
distributed with a normal distribution. A constant variance but different
mean is assumed for each of the six summer months in the sample. 22/ The
normalcy assumption appears correct. But the independence assumption
oversimplifies; there is autocorrelation between adjacent days, mainly due
to weather persistence. The best way to correct for this would be with
a weather dependent model, or barring that an autoregressive model.2 3
Figure 1 shows the daily system peaks over the sample period, to
illustrate the magnitude of the effects involved.
Equations 1 and 2 give the probability that the highest point in
day n is also a peak for the month. There remains the issue of whether
any particular time t is the highest for its day. Equation 1 was evaluated
for only one time each day: that time period which, ex poste, was the peak
for the day.
Examination of the daily load curves gives an indication of the
magnitude of the first term of the right side of equation 1, evaluated at
these particular times. Figure 2 shows the shape of Summer load curves.
It is apparent that any of the intervals in early afternoon could turn out
to be the peak for the day, depending on the vagaries of the minute by
minute random walk refered to in footnote 21. In contrast, Figure 3
illustrates that Winter peaks are sharp and predictable. In fact,
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FIGURE 1
DAILY PEAKS FOR SDG&E (MW)
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FIGURE 2
FIGURE 3
s
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the peak during the Winter almost always occurs during the same interval
as the previous day's peak. From this we estimate:
(3) P n(t) = S ] = Probability that the highest reading during the
15 minute interval around t is the peak for the day.
~=K ( .25 in Summer months
.8 in Winter months
Note that the same estimate is used for each day in a sample.
The final form of equation 1 is therefore:
(4) P[The 15 minute interval around tn', the time of peak on day n,
includes the monthly system peak]
) 0 if Sn k , for any kn /24
Z [w[Sn - ]/c' 20-n
where
jr= Mean daily system peak for the month
f = Standard deviation of system peaks (about 100 MW)
20-n= Number of working days left in the billing month.
I = Unit Normal cumulative distribution function
Finally, adjusting for the fact that each kw demanded during the Cpeak
interval incurs a charge of C, in dollars per kilowatt,
(5) C n P (tn) x C
where Cn = pseudo price for day n at time tn, in $/kw.
Figure 4 shows the estimated pseudo prices over the course of the sample.
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FIGURE 4
Estimated pseudo prices
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-14-
Demand for Electricity as a Function of Spot Pseudo Prices
Given a continually changing pseudo price, which is not known in
advance, how will a manufacturing customer respond? First, consider the
demand for electricity during the periods when the pseudo price is zero.
This will exhibit a normal pattern of diurnal, weekly, and random fluc-
tuations, based on the hour by hour operations of the electricity using
equipment in the plant. Then when the pseudo price rises above zero,
the customer can respond by shutting down some equipment temporarily,
turning up air conditioner thermostats, and similar measures discussed
in section I. How much demand is cut back will depend on the cost of
reduction compared with the amount saved.2 5/ The marginal cost of reduction will
be an increasing function of the amount of reduction, since the cheapest
cutbacks will be made first.2 6/ The costs will also depend on:
1. The amount of advance warning of high price. More advance warning
will allow time for rescheduling. If the precise time of the peak
can be anticipated, as is true in Winter months, then breaks, line
changeovers, etc. can be scheduled in advance.
2. The time of day. Certain loads, which are only run at certain times
of day, may be cheaper to curtail or reschedule than others. Also,
if human intervention is required to reduce demand, operator attentiveness
will be higher at some times than others, due to other demands on
the operator.
3. Anticipated persistence of high prices. A pseudo price of $1/kwh
which is expected to last for 30 minutes may elicit more response in
each period than one which only lasts for 15 minutes. This will be
the case if any cutbacks incur fixed costs as well as incremental
costs per unit of time. 27/
Curtailments, A, will therefore have the shape shown in Figure 5 as
a function of pseudo price C and advance warning W, at some fixed time t.
m15-
Normal dem-
and at time
t
j xI _rj
- = psud p at
C = pseudo price at t
in $/kw
Figure 5
Curtailments as a function of price C
and advance warning W (illustrative)
Econometric specification of the curtailment response function
The basic econometric model estimated here uses lagged demand to
provide a forecast of normal demands each day. Reductions below normal
demand are then explained as curtailments due to spot prices.
Becasue of the time of day price structure of San Diego Gas &Electric
rates, as well as the diurnal variations in the demand for electric
services, demand will depend on time of day even if the spot pseudo price
remains zero. One possible approach would be to attempt an engineering
or econometric model of normal demand over time. This would be more
complex than necessary to find the influence of spot prices.
A
Instead, current demand at the critical time tn was regressed on
demand of exactly one week before and on average demand for the same day.
Thus normal annual, monthly, weekly, daily, and hourly demand variations
Atr w +1 ( t,-)
01
-
.0
I
I
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(such as lunch hours) are removed. In addition any special features
affecting an entire shift or entire day will be removed via the average
daily demand term.
A linear version of Figure 5 was used to estimate the impact of spot
prices. The final equation estimated was therefore of the form:
(6) Xn(tn) a + X + (Xn t) + 7 +x C + Sn(t n)
where Cn = calculated pseudo price for day n, time tn
Xn = average demand on day n
tn = the time of highest SDG&E system load on day n
n = index for day, month, and year.
Xn(t) = demand for electricity at time t of day n.
Sn(t) = System load at time t of day n. Used as an instrument
for weather.
If customers can and do respond to spot prices, thenl[should be negative.
The null hypothesis is that customers cannot respond quickly enough, in
which caselwill be zero. The last term, involving S n() reflects the
possibility that some customers have high air conditioning demand. During
the summer the absolute level of system load in the afternoons will be
correlated with the demand for air conditioning.
Equation 6 was estimated separately for each of the three customers.
There is no rationale for thinking that the three have the same electricity
using technologies, hence similar response functions A(C,W,t). Nor is
there any reason to think they have the same pattern of shift changes,
weekly and diurnal variations, etc., hence the same constants ,B,y, or 6.
Therefore separate estimates were made for each customer.2 8/
Various extensions of equation 6 may be appropriate.
1. The relationship between average demand for the day and demand at time
t stays constant from week to week. Hence the constraint
(7) S = -j
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should hold.
2. The parameters of equation 6 may depend on the time of day. This will
certainly be the case if the plant is in full operation during the
day but reduced operation at night. Since the sample includes different
times of day ranging from 10AM to 3 PM, there is possible aggregation
error in the estimates. This could be easily corrected, albeit at some
cost for computer time.9/
3. Equation 6 ignores the questions of warning time and anticipated
persistence of high pseudo prices.
4. Finally, there is the question of short versus long run response.
SDG&E's rate schedule has been in effect for two years. This is
probably long enough to adjust plant operating procedures to the
spot pricing system. But it is not enough to change the capital
stock significantly. All else equal, we expect thelT coefficient of
responsiveness to increase in absolute value from year to year. In
particular, customer 3 added the telephone hookup between 1978 and 79.
Robust Tests
Equation 6 assumes a very special response to the Cpeak charge. First,
it assumes a comparatively sophisticated calculation of pseudo prices.
An alternative, for example, would be to make a plant operator responsible
for monitoring system load, and taking action when he deems it appropriate.
Second, it assumed a linear response to the calculated pseudo prices.
Given these assumptions, the test used to reject the null hypothesis (that
customers don't respond) is then a one tailed test that the coefficient
i s not zero.
More robust tests of the hypothesis that customers respond are also
possible. A basic test is simply to compare demand on days with some
chance of being a peak for the month against demand on days with no
chance. This can be done in two ways. First, the demand at the same
time of day can be compared for all days of the month. Second, equation
6 can be estimated withlTrrestricted to zero. Then the residuals from
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this estimation can be summed over the days with a positive pseudo price
and compared with zero. Either approach will, asymptotically, detect
nonlinear responses and responses based on either more or less sophis-
ticated calculations of pseudo prices.
All of the techniques discussed in this paper use some days of
each month as controls for comparison with other days. There is one
form of behavior which this will not detect under any circumstances.
That is changes in behavior which do not depend on the actual system
load on that particular day. For example, most peaks on Winter days
occur during the interval from 5:45 PM to 6:00 PM. It might be cost
effective to schedule shift changes for this period, regardless of the
pseudo price on any particular day. In effect the customer would be
substituting the average pseudo price for the actual spot price.30/
The only way to detect such a shift is to compare behavior before and
after the Cpeak charge was imposed.3 1/
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IV. Results
The basic results are that two of the three industrial customers are
clearly responding to the Cpeak demand charge during the Summers, while
the third customer may or may not be responding. The magnitude of the
response, however, implies that sudden adjustments of demand are quite
costly. In one case a pseudo price of $.25 per kw leads to a demand
reduction of only about 70 kw or 1.5%.32/ For the second customer, the
same price led to reductions of only about 50 kw, or 1%.
These results indicate that a significant amount of utility peak load
reducing can be achieved by the Cpeak charge. At present the utility can
impose a pseudo price of at most about $2 in Summer, and double that in
Winter.3 3 / This price would probably occur, for example, on the highest
day of the year. Such a price would reduce demand of these two customers
alone by 1 MW (compared with a maximum system load of about 2,000 MW).
The utility cn et suhstarnil??y ore effect from this rate struc-
ture by moving toward true spot pricing, ather than the once a month but
random Cpeak charge. A corrronise would be to tie the charge to the ab-
solute level of system load. In this way rluths where even the high for
the month placed no strain on SDG&E capacity would cause little incentive
for customers to shed loads. Conversely, the highest peaks of the year
would encourage substantial conservation.
Even without such modifications, however, the coincident peak charge
is clearly Pareto superior to the standard peak charge. Industrial cus-
tomers can and do find it cost effective to lower their demands at the time
of maximum system load.
Basic Results
The basic results for the three customers are shown in Table 1. The
first four coefficients predict demand on days when pseudo prices are zero,
and are not important. The important coefficient is T. It is negative
for all three customers, but significant only for the first two. (At the
1% level in both cases.)
The final term in Table 1 is shown only for customer 3. For the other
two customers the estimated value of 3 was very small, insignificant, and
its presence had almost no impact on the estimated value of T. Including
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Xn(tn) = + ~
TABLE 1
Basic Results
+xn 7 (n) + n7 + ITCn
Constant, 6k
Average demand for
day, B
Lagged demand at same
time of day, 6
Lagged average demand,6
Effect of pseudo price,
Tr in kw response per
$/kw pseudo price
Effect of absolute system
load, 
R2
Durbin-Watson
Customer 1
325
(336)
1.08
(.126)
.294
(.074)
-. 333
(.138)
-288*
(60.4)
.666
1.50
Customer 2
203
(70)
1.08
(.109)
.120
(.099)
-.248
(.140)
-194*
(56.0)
.976
1.61
Customer 3+
1076
(628)
.88
(.14)
.00
(.08)
-.13
(.10)
-46.4+
(120)
.77
(.34)
.36
1.39
Standard error 202 189 335
*Significant at the 1% level.
+Customer 3 did not install equipment to monitor system load until 1979.
This table shows results from pooled 1978 and 1979 data. See text.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. No adjustment for auto-
correlation was made in the results shown here.
Number of observations is about 120.
17 of these observations have positive values of Cn .
+ 0 Sn(tn)
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absolute system load in the explanatory variables also caused a multi-
collinearity problem for customer 2. Therefore this term is omitted in
34/
subsequent analysis.
Several other more general specifications were tested for all three
customers.3 5 / These included: a) enforcing the restriction of equation
7 on the coefficients of lagged demand; b) allowing W'to change between
1978 and 1979; c) allowing all other coefficients to change between 1978
and 1979; and d) correcting for autocorrelation of residuals. With one
exception, these specifications did not change the value of the critical
Ir parameter by more than 10 kw/$/kw, not enough to affect any conclu-
sions. For example, forcing the nonlinear restriction that - i 
changed the values ofe and greatly. But in no case did it alterWT
appreciably, nor did it change the standard error of the equation. Thus
the conclusion that customers 1 and 2 did reduce their demand in response
to high instantaneous pseudo prices appears robust. Customer 3 remained
ambiguous.
The one specification which did affect the value of was to allow it
to change between 1978 and 1979. For customer 2, this made an appreciable
difference, as shown in Table 2.
Customer 1 Customer 2 Customer 3
1If joint 78/79)
179
-288
(60)
-312
(116)
!t -284
(729
'L-I
-194
(56)
-364
(104)
-1312 {645
i
¥
t I
-47
(120)
15
(200)
-70
(1360
Table 2: Changes in price responsiveness
between years (kw per $/kw)
For customer 2, a Chow test indicates that price responsiveness probable
did change between the two years. However, the customer became less re-
sponsive, rather than more responsive as we would expect due to long
term adaptation. Customer 1 also changed in the wrong direction, although
\IVV/
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not significantly.
Customer 3 also changed, showing a much larger response in 1979.
This is to be expected, since this customer installed a telephone link
to monitor system load, between the two Summers. However even the 1979
coefficient is not large enough to unequivocally reject the null hypothesis
of no response. 3 6 /
Estimating changes from 1978 to 1979 was frustrated by the small
number of days in the sample with non-zero pseudo prices. This is shown
on Figure 4. Extending the sample to cover more months in each year is
the only solution.
Robust Test Results
As discussed, equation 6 assumes a linear response to the spot
pseudo price. It also assumes a moderately sophisticated calculation of
this price. One test was made which did not require such assumptions.
Equation 6 was estimated withirheld to zero, i.e. assuming that customers
do not respond to pseudo prices at all. Then the residuals from this es-
timation were summed over those days for which Cn was positive, i.e. on
which there was some chance of a peak. Under the null hypothesis, the
sum of these residuals will have mean zero, and asymptotically be normally
distributed. But if a positive chance of a peak leads to reduced demand,
the sum of the residuals will be negative, regardless of the exact form
of the response function.3 7 / The results are shown in Table 3.
It is clear from the bottom row of this table that customers 1 and 2
were indeed reducing demand when there was a significant chancpof incurring
a Cpeak charge. On the other hand it appears that customer 3 was not
responding, at least not effectively. The sum of its residuals on the
appropriate days was only .04 standard deviations below that expected by
pure chance. Segregating residuals into 1978 and 1979 observations gives
a positive sum for 1979. Again, the small sample problem mentioned in
footnote 36 frustrates analysis of customer 3.
-23-
TABLE 3
A Robust Test of Response
A A
n-7(tn) +6x1 + Sn(tn) + f(Cn)Xn(tn) =d+n + X 
Estimate with f(Cn) - 0
Then find V
If f(C n ) 0
V
(no response)
= [u n +f(Cn)].
n s.t.
Cn>>0
is true, then V > Normal(O, N.3)
where N is the number of days
with Cn > O.
Customer
1
-2578
852
+
Customer
2
-2425
Customer
3
-60
770 1320
V/ir o
-.04
*Significant at the .005 level.
+ In small samples, even if the true residuals are iid Normal, V will have
variance;
E E [I-X(X'X) - 1 X ]ij
Sample size: N=15, total sample size = 120.
Il··lllrrrrrrlrrr,·Il·llr 
- 'L__.._, _ _...__ 
__
+ 
n
-3.2*
-3.2*
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Interpretation and Significance of Results
The results of this paper demonstrate that some large industrial
customers can and will respond to rapidly varying ("spot") prices of
electricity. This overcomes an important theoretical objection which has
been raised to spot or homeostatic pricing, namely that customers could not
respond rapidly enough to the price signals. But the results also suggest
that the strength of the response may be low for some customers. On site
interviews, and engineering/economic analysis in the style of Manichaikul
and Schweppe3 9/ would be needed to find out why customer 3 did not respond more.
(Absent a much larger cross section than will ever come out of the current
San Diego rate structure.)
How large is the response of the two customers who definitely did
react? Measured conventionally, it is miniscule, especially if considered
in terms of energy (kwh used during the 15 minute period) instead of
power (kilowatts). Both customers showed an elasticity of roughly .002
in terms of power, one quarter that in terms of energy used over 15 minutes.4 0/
As mentioned earlier, even this small elasticity can be quite useful
and cost effective for a utility which a) can use very high prices for short
periods of time, and b) has the sole objective of delaying additions to
capacity. The days of annual and seasonal peaks are guaranteed to have
high pseudo prices. With high pseudo prices, the utility can cut several
megawatts off its peak, judging by the results of the calculations in this
paper.
It is also clear that, from the broader perspective of homeostatic
pricing, the bang/bang feature of the Cpeak charge has undesirable properties.
The pseudo prices will not correspond to true marginal generating costs
for more than a few hours a month, since as long as an earlier day of the
month had a higher system load, customers will have no incentive to reduce
use, no matter how overloaded the SDG&E system is. In addition, the present
pricing schedule presents problems to customers. First, it may not be cost
effective for them to arrange load shedding procedures and equipment which
will only be used a few hours a month, at most. Second, to truly minimize
;I 
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their expected electricity bill, they must continually calculate the
probability that the next 15 minutes will contain the peak for the month.
This requires an on line, real time computer, or a very alert human op-
erator. SDG&E, on the other hand, can calculate these probabilities fairly
easily, and do so for all affected customers at once. If the utility were
to substitute either the probability, or better yet a true and guaranteed
price in cents per kilowatt hour, for the load information now sent out
on its telephone line, customers would not have to do these calculations.
Thus there is a natural progression from the Cpeak charge to homeostatic/
spot pricing. (Of course equitable distribution of the resulting savings
to both customers and the utility might have to be negotiated.)
What would be the behavior of customers who faced continually evolving
spot prices, rather than the bang/bang feature of the current price system?
Unfortunately their response in the present case tells us only a little about
the more general case. Most important, some of the customers would respond.
(Remember the self selection bias in the current sample.) But it might
become cost effective for them to undertake a much broader adaptation to
the new rate structure. At present, only a few relatively unimportant
pieces of equipment may be set up to drop loads at critical times. Equip-
ment for which there is a high cost for the shutdown/startup sequence
would not be set to respond. But in a situation with homeostatic prices,
there would be longer periods of high prices. (It is also likely that
prices early in the day would give better indications of prices later in
the day. With more advance warning, responses would also be higher.) Hence
more response would probably occur under homeostatic pricing than is
suggested by the very low elasticities calculated here.4 1/
Possible Biases and Errors
Many real or potential problems with this study have already been
mentioned. This section attempts to list all which may be important.
In many cases, the data to ameliorate them is already available, and merely
needs to be mounted on a computer.
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1. Limited sample. Because of time and data availability, the sample
estimated was limited to one observation per day, for six months (out of
two years) and 6 customers (.out of 21 on this rate schedule, of whom six
receive real time telephone signals). A larger sample would provide more
information.
2. Advance warning. There is theoretical reason to expect more response
with several hours of advance warning that a system peak might be approaching.
This was not tested.
3. Time of day. If shift changes, breaks, or other changes in production
occur between 12:30 PM and 2:30 PM, then responsiveness to pseudo price
may depend on time of day. Also, when a high system load occurs late
in the afternoon, there is less chance that it will be followed by an
even higher reading. Therefore the "constant" in equation 4 may depend
on the time of day.
4. Biases in the calculation of the pseudo prices, Cn. Most days
unequivocally had a pseudo price of zero, throughout the day. The
exact price on other days is harder to calculate. But the ordinal
ranking of days would probably not change much when using more sophistic-
ated calculations.
5. Autocorrelation. The Durbin Watson statistics from the estimates of
equation 6 consistently indicated positive autocorrelation in the residuals.
This is to be expected. The regressions used demand lagged by one week;
demand the previous day would be positively correlated. Also, because
weather persistence was not considered in the calculation of pseudo
prices, these prices tended to be autocorrelated. Equation 6 was estim-
ated with a correction for first order autocorrelation. But the maximum
likelihood values of e were only about .1 to .15, and this adjustment had
little impact on the estimates.
7. Omitted variables. Temperature or some other measure of air conditioning
load might be important for some customers. Using gross system load as an
instrument is acceptable, but not efficient since it contains many other
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components also.
A more complete model, which would better predict demand at each time
in the absence of a Cpeak charge, would have given smaller residuals and
hence tighter estimates of responsiveness to the Cpeak charge. Such a model
might improve the low R2 of equation 6 for customers 1 and 3.
8. Evolution of customer behavior over time. Tests for changes from
1978 to 1979 were tried, but were inconclusive. Putting in 12 months
of data for each year would allow tests with higher power.
Conclusion
San Diego Gas and Electric Company has put into effect a rate
schedule in which the cost per kilowatt hour is not known in advance.
Several of its largest customers have chosen to pay the fixed costs
for telephone equipment which allows them to better monitor the
price at each moment. These customers then adjust their demands
for electricity according to the instantaneous or "spot" price.
The success of this concept, at least on a limited scale, suggests
the value of further pursuit of the more general concept of "homeostatic
pricing", in which the price of electricity changes continuously,
reflecting the true marginal costs of generation at that time. In
fact relatively slight changes in the rate structure in the direction
of homeostatic pricing may be the logical next step.
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FOOTNOTES
1. For examples, see John T. Wenders and Lester D. Taylor, 1976, "Exper-
iments in seasonal-time-of-day pricing of electricity to residential
users," The Bell Journal of Economics, volume 7 pp 531-552.
2. Roger Sherman and Michael Visscher, 1978, "Second best pricing with
stochastic demand", American Economic Review, volume 68 no. 1, pp41-53.
3. MIT Center for Energy Policy Research, and Electric Power Systems
Engineering Laboratory, "New Electric Utility Management and Control
Systems", conference proceedings, June 1979. See also the forthcoming
paper, Fred C. Schweppe et al, "Homeostatic utility control", IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems.
4. For example, the option to purchase a fixed amount of electricity at a
prespecified price, from 10AM to noon the next day. Such options could
be "sold" electronically the night before.
5. Regulatory intervention in the price setting process would presumably
be necessary. William Vickrey, "Efficient pricing under regulations:
the case of responsive pricing as a substitute for interruptible pcwer
contracts," June 1978, unpublished, proposes a "pool" which wVould
be rebated to customers at the end of the year. His concept of "respon-
sive pricing" is very similar to "homeostatic" or "spot" pricing.
6. But see B.M. Mitchell, W.G. Manning Jr., and J.P. Acton, "Electricity
Pricing and Load Management: Foreign Experience and California Opportu-
nities," Rand Corporation Report R-2106-CERCDC, March 1977.
7. Although the British apparently use a related system called "Peak
Period Warnings." Ibid.
8. An exception is M. Barry Goldman and Howard B. Sosin, 1979, "Infor-
mation dissemination, market efficiency, and the frequency of transactions,"
Journal of Financial Ecenomics, Volume 7 no. 1, pp 29-61. The analogy
between a stock market and the electricity "market" implied in this
paper is strong.
9. But each customer could generate a subjective probability distribution
of the price at some future time. As the time approaches, the distribu-
tion would usually become more peaked. Note the value of a futures
market for electricity as a means of "pooling" different customers
estimates of the spot price at a later time.
10. For the San Diego Gas &Electric rate structure discussed in this paper,
the answers are: a rate is in effect for 15 minutes; the customer is
told the rate in the middle of the period to which it applies, so there
is almost no advance warning; the rules were approved by the CPUC more
than two years ago.
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11. However only peak period hours are eligible. During Winter months,
the peak must fall between 5 PM and 9 PM, PST. During the Summer
months, the peak must fall between 10 AM and 5 PM, PST. Weekends and
holidays are ineligible. Thus the customer does not have to monitor
the system load at other times.
12. The peak during the Summer is heavily influenced by air conditioning
load. Therefore these customers would use a temperature related
estimate of probabilities.
13. One customer installed the telephone monitoring equipment midway
through the sample.
14. This data had holes which were filled by interpolation from hourly load
profiles.
15. Average demand for the day was used as the criterion for dropping a day.
16. No footnote.
17. F.D. Galiana, "Short term load forecasting," 1976 (?), IEEE Transactions
on Power Apparatus and Systems (?).
18. F.D. Galiana and F.C. Schweppe, 1972, "A weather dependent probabil-
istic model for short term load forecasting," paper C 72 171-2,
IEEE Winter Meeting, 1972.
19. Such information would be available to customers, with some effort.
Therefore customers could have better estimates of pseudo prices than
the estimates developed here. This will introduce some measurement
error into the regressions, as discussed below.
20. It is reasonable to treat each customer as a perfect competitor, since
each customer's load is less than .5% of the system peak load.
21. Movements over this short a time period can probably be described as
a Wiener process, ignoring drift. Note that the volatility of this
process may be important. If one waits until the middle of a 15
minute interval to realise one should reduce demand, the effect will
be proportionally reduced. (The 15 minute demand meters integrate over
each quarter hour.)
22. To allow for seasonal variation and trends in peak loads.
23. First order autocorrelation of daily peaks was about .7. However
even an AR(1) model would not eliminate measurement error, since most
of this persistence was due to weather.
24. Actually, if Sk - Sn < 10 MW this was adjusted to allow for the possibility
that demand would rise several MW during the next few minutes. Ex poste,
we know this didn't happen. But that could not have been known at the
time.
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25. Actually the expected value of savings, since pseudo price is an
expected value. We assume all customers are risk neutral for such
small dollar amounts.
26. Except that there may be an initial nonconvexity, if there is a fixed
cost which must be incurred before the first curtailment can take
effect.
27. See Mohan Munasinghe and Mark Gellerson, "Economic criteria for
optimizing power system reliability levels," 1979, The Bell Journal
of Economics, Vol. 10 no. 1, pp 353-365 for a discussion of the
cost to customers of blackouts. Such costs are an upper bound on the
amount of price incentive needed to achieve voluntary demand reductions.
28. Because of the approximate methods used to estimate the pseudo prices,
there will be measurement errors which should be correlated between
customers. Therefore the residuals should be positively correlated
on days when Cn was positive. In fact, the residuals were slightly
negatively correlated, perhaps because of time of day effects. Therefore
Zellner estimation was not attempted.
29. Such estimation would have been simple if the data were available on
computer tape, since there would then be massive amounts of information
available to estimate normal demand at each time of day. Instead, the 15
minute demands were available only on paper.
30. If half of all Winter peaks fall during this interval, the average
pseudo price is about 70¢ per kilowatt hour, over the entire month!
31. See Electrical World, September 15, 1979 pp 138-139 for a comparison of
average demands of pooled schedule A-6 customers at the time of peak,
before and after the rate was changed.
32. Some results have been scaled to protect the confidentiality of customers.
33. Since the peaks are sharper in Winter, the customer can be more certain
which 15 minute interval will contain the peak.
34. These two customers may_still have had air conditioning loads. The
daily average demand, Xn, would also pick up air conditioning demand.
35. Given an unlimited amount of data with no multicolli-nearity problems,
it would be ideal to use the most general specification in all tests.
As shown, this would not have changed the conclusions.
36. The power of the test on 1979 data alone is low. There are only 8 days
with positive pseudo prices in Summer 1979. Four of these are
consecutive days in August. (See Figure 4.) Customer 3 happened to
have very high demand on 3 of these 4 days, perhaps because of something
happening that week.
37. The null hypothesis is thus that f(Cn) 0, compared with f(C)0.O when
C>O. In either case we expect that f(O)=O. We also know that f(C) is
non increasing, but this restriction is not incorporated into the test.
38. No footnote.
39. Y. Manichaikul and FC. Schweppe,"Physical/ economic analysis of
industrial demand," presented at the IEEE Power Engineering Society
1979 Summer Meeting, July 1979.
40. Since the impact of a $7/kw Cpeak charge, measured on demand over 15
minutes, is $28/kwh. Of course if the peak were measured instantaneously,
this would be an infinite chargeper kwh at the critical instant!
41. Of course this depends on how the homeostatic prices compare with the
Cpeak charge. Consider a Cpeak charge of $1 per kw, in effect for 15
minutes. Compare this with a spot charge of $1 per kwh, in effect for
an hour. Both raise $1 of revenue from a lkw load which is on forthe entire
hour. But the customer might be willing to turn off his equipment only
for the former rate, for only 15 minutes. On the other hand the true
higher costs to SDG&E are probably incurred over several hours. In
addition the spot price would be more predictable, allowing customers
to take actions which require longer lead times.
